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ABSTRACT Smart grid takes advantage of communication technologies for efficient energy management
and utilization. It entails sacrifice from consumers in terms of reducing load during peak hours by using
a dynamic energy pricing model. To enable an active participation of consumers in load management,
the concept of home energy gateway (HEG) has recently been proposed in the literature. However, the HEG
concept is rather new, and the literature still lacks to address challenges related to data representation,
seamless discovery, interoperability, security, and privacy. This paper presents the design of a communication
framework that effectively copes with the interoperability and integration challenges between devices from
different manufacturers. The proposed communication framework offers seamless auto-discovery and zero-
configuration-based networking between heterogeneous devices at consumer sites. It uses elliptic-curve-
based security mechanism for protecting consumers’ privacy and providing the best possible shield against
different types of cyberattacks. Experiments in real networking environment validated that the proposed
communication framework is lightweight, secure, portable with low-bandwidth requirement, and flexible
to be adopted for dynamic energy management in smart grid.
INDEX TERMS Smart grid, dynamic energy management, utility services, universal plug & play, smart
home.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, efficient energymanagement and utilization is becom-
ing increasingly important due to depletion of available elec-
tricity generation resources at an alarming rate [1]. Smart
grid offers not only enormous opportunities for integration of
renewables but also plays a vital role in distributed dynamic
energy management at consumer sites [2]. Emerging smart
grid services require certain sacrifice from consumers in
terms of reducing load at peak demand hours in order to
prevent load-shedding/blackout. This is achieved by using
dynamic energy pricingmodel based on load forecast [3]–[5].
Utilities will offer higher price at peak-hours and lower price
at off-peak hours [6]. To save on electricity bills, consumers
will operate household appliances during off-peak hours.
Dynamic energy management requires an intelligent
device at the consumer sites to enable effective command
and control from the utility. The concept of Home Energy
Gateway (HEG) has recently been proposed in literature for
easing the development of smart grid services such as load
management, home automation, integration of renewables,
dynamic energy pricing, etc [7], [8]. The basic scenario is
depicted in Fig. 1. The HEG communicates with the utility as
well as with household appliances (e.g., heaters, TV, refriger-
ator, air-conditioner, washing machine, etc). It continuously
tracks and controls the operational state of appliances based
on user-specified configurations or real-time commands from
the utility.
A. PAPER MOTIVATION
This paper addresses three key challenges in the design
of dynamic energy management service in smart grid:
(i) seamless auto-discovery, (ii) interoperability and integra-
tion, and (iii) security and privacy.
Many consumers may not have technical skills to config-
ure appliances and establish their communication with the
HEG. Future network-enabled household appliances must
operate as plug & paly without requiring any configurations
from the user. Thus, the HEG and appliances need to inherent
auto-discovery feature to enable seamless mutual discovery
and communication as soon as connected to the network.
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FIGURE 1. Distributed dynamic energy management in
smart grid.
Household appliances are normally manufactured by dif-
ferent companies using custom protocols and data represen-
tations. This raises interoperability and integration issues due
to lack of a standard communication framework. Thus, a com-
mon communication framework needs to be investigated and
adopted by all manufacturers.
Security and privacy is always a major concern for
Internet-based services. The HEG exchanges sensitive con-
sumer information with the utility and receives commands
to control household appliances. Any compromise of the
HEG communication could lead to severe consequences such
as increased electricity bill, unmanageable load increase on
utility, blackout, operation of critical appliances at undesir-
able time, etc. Thus, a strong security mechanism is utmost
necessary to protect communication from cyber-attacks.
B. PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS
The HEG (or gateway in general) has been developed by sev-
eral researchers in literature focusing on a specific challenge
e.g., auto-discovery [8], [9], interoperability [7], [9]–[11] or
security [12], [13]. However, literature still lacks a compre-
hensive communication framework that could address chal-
lenges (presented in Section I-A) all together.
This paper investigates and develops a comprehensive
communication framework (for the HEG and household
appliances) that is equipped with all essential features
presented in Section I-A (seamless auto-discovery, inter-
operability/integration and security). It is designed to be
light-weight, highly configurable and flexible enough to be
integrated in heterogeneous appliances by different manufac-
turers. In short, key contributions of this paper include:
1) Design of the system architecture and clear functional
and technical specifications towards practically imple-
menting the dynamic energy management service in
smart grid. This includes the investigation of basic
requirements and features for the HEG, household
appliances and the utility.
2) Design and development of the Universal Plug &
Play (UPnP) technology for overcoming interoperabil-
ity and integration issues as well as achieving two-way
command and control features between the HEG and
heterogeneous household appliances. This complex
framework consists:
• Design of UPnP based two-way command and
control communication system architecture.
• Implementation of Simple Service Discovery Pro-
tocol (SSDP) for enabling auto-discovery and
hassle-free zero-configuration based networking
between the HEG and household appliances.
• Implementation of Simple Object Access Proto-
col (SOAP) for sending and receiving commands.
• Implementation of General Event Notification
Architecture (GENA) for sending and receiv-
ing notifications/information about devices oper-
ational state.
3) A suitable methodology for tracking devices opera-
tional state in a seamless manner. This includes devel-
opment of a Power State Monitoring (PSM) module for
seamlessly monitoring operational status of appliances
from the kernel and keeping the HEG updated.
4) Design and implementation of elliptic curve based
security mechanism to protect privacies of consumers
and shield against different types of cyber-attacks.
5) Functional and performance evaluation of proposed
system in real networking environment.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents previ-
ous works from literature. Section III presents an overview
of the proposed system and design challenges. Section IV
presents design and characteristics of proposed communica-
tion framework. Section V describes the implementations.
Analysis of the security mechanism is provided in section VI.
Section VII practically evaluates the proposed system in real
networking environment. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Dynamic energy management is an important factor revo-
lutionizing traditional grids into smart grids. Yao et al. [14]
proposed a residential load management mechanism by using
Photo-Voltaic (PV) cells installed on the rooftop. It sched-
ules the operation of deferrable household appliances from
peak-hours to off-peak hours and maximizes the use of local
generated electricity from PV units. The excess electricity
from PV units is contributed to the main grid. Gomez and
Anjos [5] proposed a mechanism to forecast load and manage
building heating/cooling appliances accordingly. It ensures
customer satisfaction by maintaining comfortable building
temperature while also helps grid to meet demand-response
requirements. Several researchers have investigated load
scheduling mechanisms for dynamic energy management in
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smart grid [15]–[17]. Khoury et al. [17] proposed a method-
ology to optimize energy storage under intermittent of
electricity from the grid. It uses predictive scheduling to
ensure continuous supply of electricity for critical household
appliances.
The HEG (or gateway in general) is required at each
consumer site for dynamic energy management service. The
Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) alliance played an
important role in the modular design of home gateways [18].
Several researchers have adopted the concept and devel-
oped modular gateways [8], [19], [20]. Bolla et al. [8]
used HTTP client-server model and presented software
architecture. However, presented work lacks system require-
ments/specifications and does not address interoperabil-
ity/integration and security issues. Whereas, [19] focused on
the gateway components but did not address communica-
tion aspects. Verba et al. [20] addressed interoperability for
Internet of Things (IoT) devices but lacked plug & play,
auto-discovery and security features.
Several researchers have developed gateways for energy
management using MQTT protocol due to its small foot-
print and low bandwidth requirement [7], [11]. Lee and
Lai [7] proposed a mechanism for scheduling the operation
of devices based on home energy consumption data received
in the cloud. Presented work is very brief and does not
include detailed technical specifications. Furthermore, pro-
posed gateway lacks auto-discovery, zero-configuration and
security features. Alternative protocol options for gateway
design are XMPP [10] and CoAP [21]. XMPP provides inter-
operability to certain extent but lacks auto-discovery and
security features. CoAP can operate over DTLS security but
lacks its own built-in security mechanism.
Security threats and consequences in case of a cyber-attack
have been identified by several researchers [22]–[24].
Khan et al. [22] investigated different Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attack scenarios in which a smart grid service can
be compromised. Liang et al. [23] studied impact of data
tampering or false data injection on the control algorithms.
Whereas, Yao et al. [24] investigated stealthy cyber-attacks
on smart metering infrastructure network and identified
potential theft of electricity if the communication is com-
promised. Most protocols used in the HEG design lack
security features. Thus, additional security technologies must
be incorporated.
Although, different protocols and gateway designs have
been studied by several researchers, literature works still
lack at-least one or more of the challenges addressed in
Section I-A. Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate
and develop a comprehensive communication framework
that provides auto-discovery, zero-configuration based plug
& play communication, interoperability, integration, privacy
and security features.
III. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposed system consists of utility, the HEG, household
appliances as shown in Fig. 2. Communication between the
FIGURE 2. Overview of proposed system.
HEG and household appliances is local while communication
between the HEG and utility passes over public Internet. The
complexity and challenges for both communication types are
different. Due to private LAN, there are no security concerns
for communication between the HEG and household appli-
ances. However, proper security measures are necessary to
protect privacies of consumers for communication between
the HEG and utility. Therefore, communication framework is
designed based on the requirements (as shown in Fig. 2) and
consists of UPnP technology and ECC-based secure HTTP.
The UPnP technology offers several interesting features
including hassle free zero configuration based networking
between the HEG and household appliances. It enables appli-
ances to seamlessly discover and communicate with the HEG
as soon as connected to the network. The keying material
and security policies for ECC-based secure HTTP commu-
nication framework are refreshed periodically in order to
achieve best possible protection against cyber-attacks includ-
ing cryptanalysis. These security policies consists of signa-
ture algorithm, key size, validity, authentication method, etc.
The HEG plays an important role in the design of
distributed dynamic energy management service in smart
grid. For energy management with better user satisfaction,
the HEG can be configured to control appliances based on: (i)
energy price, (ii) time frame, and (iii) operational importance
of the appliance. Thinking rational economically, consumers
will schedule load to off-peak hours (low energy price). Alter-
natively, consumers may grant control of appliances to the
utility that will remotely control their operational state based
on current load or energy price. The control of appliances can
also be based on their operational importance e.g., heating is
strictly necessary during night in winter.
Basic requirements for proposed system can be classified
into three sections: (i) requirements for household appliances,
(ii) requirements for the HEG, and (iii) requirements for
utility.
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES
Appliances need to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• They should operate as plug & play for user conve-
nience. This includes seamless discovery and commu-
nication with the HEG without requiring any configura-
tions.
• They must support a common set of features to achieve
interoperability if manufactured by different companies.
• They should be able to operate in any network topology
(e.g., bus, ring, star, mesh or hybrid).
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• Each appliance should have a unique identity. Due to
private IP addresses used in home networks, the Uni-
versally Unique IDentifiers (UUID) is ideal choice for
identity.
• They should be able to track changes in their operational
or power state and immediately notify the HEG.
• They should be able to update their operational state
based on the instructions received from the HEG.
• They should support network based wake-up or switch-
ingON features (e.g.,Wake-On-LAN (WOL),Wake-on-
Wireless-LAN (WoWLAN), etc).
• They should embed built-in intelligence and decide if
commands from the HEG are safe enough to execute,
otherwise ignore the commands.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE HEG
The HEG needs to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• It should be easily accessible by utility and het-
erogeneous household appliances supporting common
protocol.
• It should keep track of the power/operational state and
capabilities of each appliance.
• It should be able to automate the use of household appli-
ances based on the instructions received from utility.
• It should be able to send commands to appliances
e.g., operation on, operation off, go to standby, etc.
• It should be able to wake-up an appliance (e.g., WOL).
• It should implement a standard Firewall to prevent unau-
thorized access of adversaries to the local network.
• It should implement a security mechanism for protecting
communication with utility from cyber-attacks.
• It should have minimal resource requirements and com-
fortably operate on resource constraint gateway devices.
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR UTILITY
The utility needs to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• It should keep track of each consumer site (number of
appliances, power consumptions, etc). Each consumer
site can be uniquely identified from the HEG’s UUID.
• It should implement a security mechanism for protecting
communication with consumer sites from cyber-attacks.
• It should provide current energy price and demand infor-
mation to the HEG at each consumer site.
• It should be able to control appliances through the HEG
(e.g., switch ON/OFF flexible appliances).
IV. DESIGN OF COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORK
This section addresses proposedUPnP and ECC-based secure
HTTP communication framework (shown in Fig. 2).
A. UPNP COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
The choice of UPnP technology for home network is moti-
vated for several reasons: (i) auto-discovery between devices,
(ii) zero-configuration based networking, (iii) it solves inter-
operability and integration issues between appliances from
different manufacturers, (iv) it supports state variables and
eventing, and (v) it is easily supported on any network device.
FIGURE 3. UPnP semantics between the HEG and household
appliances.
UPnP technology enables HEG to seamlessly discover
available appliances, monitor their operation state and exe-
cute commands on them (Fig. 3 depicts basic communica-
tion semantics). As soon as an appliance is connected to
the network, it acquires an IP address using DHCP proto-
col. The next step is discovery in which a device announces
its presence in the network and also discovers the presence of
other UPnP devices using SSDP protocol. After discovery,
both the HEG and appliances retrieve service descriptions
(capabilities, actions, commands, etc) of each other. With the
knowledge of service description, the HEG and household
appliances can send and receive control commands using
SOAP protocol. When any state variable of an appliance
changes (e.g., power state), the UPnP mechanism immedi-
ately notifies the HEG using GENA protocol. Presentation is
the last step in which description of a UPnP device can be
retrieved from its URL.
The UPnP device architecture [25] consists of two types
of devices: Control Point (CP) and Controlled Device (CD).
Functionalities of CP are similar to a client whereas, CD to
a server. In general, one device implements a CP (can only
send commands) and other device implements a CD (can only
receive commands). In proposed system, both the HEG and
household appliances implement a CP as well as a CD (to
achieve two-way command & control) as depicted in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Communication scenario between the HEG and
household appliances.
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TABLE 1. Actions provided by UPnP power management service offered by household appliances. IN means ‘parameters/values sent
to the receiving device’ while OUT means ‘parameters/values returned back to the sender’.
TABLE 2. Actions provided by UPnP service offered by the HEG. IN means ‘parameters/values sent to the receiving device’ while OUT
means ‘parameters/values returned back to the sender’.
To achieve interoperability, a common UPnP service needs
to be implemented by household appliances (as shown
in Table 1). It consists of state variables (i.e., WakeMethod,
PowerState, StartTime, StopTime, etc) and a list of actions
that the HEG can invoke on household appliances such as:
(i) GetPowerState: Provides current power state to the HEG,
(ii) WakeUpMethod: Provides information to the HEG about
supported wake-up method, (iii) OperationOn: The appli-
ance starts its operations, (iv) OperationOff: The appliance
stops its operations, (v) GoToStandby: The appliance goes to
sleep/standby state, (vi) StandbyPeriod: The appliance will
stay in sleep state during specified start and stop period, and
(vii)Withdraw: Withdraws an action previously registered.
Similarly, the HEG also implements a UPnP service
(as shown in Table 2). It consists of actions invokable by
household appliances such as: (i) WakeUpTime: The HEG
should wake the appliance up at specified time, (ii) NoStand-
byPeriod: The HEG should avoid putting an appliance into
sleep state during the specified period, and (iii) Withdraw:
Withdraws an action previously registered.
B. ECC-BASED SECURE HTTP COMMUNICATION
The ECC-based secure HTTP can be most suitable choice
for communication between the HEG and utility due to:
(i) structured meta-data, (ii) HTTP flow is normally open
through Firewalls, and (iii) highest level of protection for con-
fidentiality and integrity of communication with low compu-
tational cost. Several features of ECCbased security approach
make it ideal choice: (i) use of elliptic curve mechanism
for establishing secret key over insecure network, (ii) use
of sender private key to assure non-repudiation (iii) com-
putationally efficient compared to Diffie Hellman [26],
and (iv) suitable for real-time communication. ECC-based
secure communication architecture consists of the following
steps:
1) KEY GENERATION MECHANISM
The key generation procedure is shown in Algorithm 1.
Before starting to generate public/private key pair, HEG/
Utility first selects an elliptic curve EP(a, b). It then chooses
a point on this elliptic curve i.e., E1 and a random number R.
This random number is an additive factor that shows how
many times E1 must be added with itself to generate E2.
HEG/Utility keeps this random number secret as its private
key and announces E1, E2 and P as public key.
Algorithm 1 Key Generation
1: procedure
2: Select an elliptic curve EP(a, b)
3: Select a point E1 on EP(a, b)
4: Select a random number R
5: Calculate E2 = RE1 mod P
6: Keep R secret as private key
7: Make ( E1, E2, EP(a, b)) public
8: end procedure
2) SECURE COMMUNICATION
For secure communication, a message is first encrypted and
then its hash (i.e., MAC) is calculated. This approach helps
the receiver to verify the message first and then decrypt to
save computational resources (a fake/corrupted message is
simply discarded without decryption). The proposed one-to-
one secure communication model works as follow:
• For theHEG to communicate with theUtility, it requests
the public key of Utility from the central Key Manage-
ment Center (KMC).
• HEG encrypts the message (M) using its own randomly
generated number (RHEG) and public key parameters
of Utility (EU1,EU2,EP) where EU2 = RUtilityEU1 as
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FIGURE 5. Basic software structures in the proposed communication framework. (a) Utility. (b) HEG. (c) Appliance.
follow:
C1 = RHEGEU1 mod P (1)
C2 = M + RHEGEU2 mod P (2)
where C1 and C2 are the cipher text generated from
the message M using the utility public key parameters
E1,E2 and a random number RREG.
• Once the message is encrypted, HEG generates a MAC
from the encrypted message using a hashing function H
and signs it with its own private key RHEG as
MAC = {H (C1 + C2)}RHEG (3)
• HEG sends C1, C2 andMAC to Utility
HEG→ Utility : [C1 || C2 || MAC] (4)
• Utility creates MAC ′ from the received message. It also
decrypts the received MAC using the HEG public key
KHEG and compares it with the createdMAC ′ as
MAC ′ = H (C1 + C2)
MAC = {H (C1 + C2)RHEG}KHEG = H (C1 + C2) (5)
• If received decrypted MAC is equal to new calculated
MAC ′, it accepts and decrypts the entire message as
M = C2 − (RUtility × C1) modP (6)
M = M + RHEGRUtilityEU1 − RUtilityRHEGEU1 mod P
(7)
M = M (8)
otherwise it discards the message.
V. IMPLEMENTATIONS
The generic architecture of software entities for utility, HEG
and household appliances is shown in Fig. 5. The Power
System block in utility software (see Fig. 5(a)) is presented in
generic way and its functionalities are based on the smart grid
service. For dynamic energy management service under con-
sideration, Power System block provides current energy price
and demand information. The behavioral rules are invoking
different actions based on the information received from
Power System block (e.g., informs the HEG to reduce load
to certain threshold). The HTTP block implements client and
server for two-way communication with the HEG. Commu-
nication security is achieved using ElGamal ECC.
The functional blocks of the HEG software are shown
in Fig. 5(b). It embeds a UPnP CP as well as a CD for two
way communication with household appliances. The CP is
used for sending commands whereas CD receives commands
from household appliances. The Utility Client is used for
communication with utility and provides it access to the local
implementation of energy management service.
The functional blocks of the software for household appli-
ances are shown in Fig. 5(c). Similarly to the HEG, it also
embeds a UPnP CP as well as a CD for two way communica-
tion with the HEG. It implements all of the actions specified
in Section IV. The home appliance also implements a PSM
kernel module. The PSM module continuously monitors all
changes in the operation or power state (e.g., switch ON,
switch OFF, sleep state, etc) of the device and immediately
notifies the HEG over UPnP communication framework.
All three software entities in Fig. 5 were implemented
using C/C++ programming language in the Linux operating
system. The libupnp libraries were used for the implementa-
tion of UPnP communication framework. For ease in imple-
mentation of network tasks, boost libraries were used.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To validate the security features, first we describe the adver-
sary/threat model to highlight the attacker’s capabilities. Then
the proposed security mechanism is analyzed against various
attacks based on the attacker capabilities.
A. ADVERSARY MODEL
Weconsider an adversarywith the following capabilities: (i) it
has full access to the network communications, and (ii) it can
listen, capture, store, modify, replay, delay and dropmessages
(packets). The different types of attacks that we consider
in this article are the threats to information/key messages
exchanged between two devices.
B. SECURITY ATTACKS
Messages must be secured from the understanding, modifica-
tion and replication by an attacker. Such types of attacks are
called communication-based attacks and they include:
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1) SYBIL ATTACKS
In this type of attack, attacker creates multiple fake nodes
that carry the authentic node IDs. But these fake nodes have
only the public keys of authentic nodes and have no infor-
mation regarding the private keys. Once these fake nodes
receive the messages that are encrypted by public keys, they
cannot decrypt it. This is because, they need private keys for
decryption. But private keys are only known to the authentic
devices and only the authentic devices are able to respond to
themessage. In the proposed framework, HEGuses the public
private key approach, hence an attacker cannot succeed by
creating fake HEGs as these fake HEGs will not be able to
decrypt and respond to correct queries.
2) MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK
As the name implies, in these attacks the attacker manages to
intercept all exchanges between two communicating parties
without revealing its real identity to either of them. Hence,
in order to succeed, the attacker needs to successfully imper-
sonate each communicating party in the session. However,
in our framework each device is authenticated based on their
public private key pair which prevents its impersonation. For
example, if an attacker wants to impersonate an authentic
device during the communication between KMC and HEG,
the attacker cannot sign a hash generated for each message
using the authentic HEG/KMC private key. This is because
the private key is only known to the authentic HEGs/KMC.
3) AUTHENTICATION ATTACKS
During the authentication phase, sender uses its own pub-
lic/private key pair and receiver public key to verify and
authenticate each other. To do so, sender creates the hash of a
message and sings it by its own private key. Sender encrypts
the message along with its signed hash using receiver public
key and send it to the receiver. Receiver upon receiving the
message, it decrypts the message using its own private key
to extract the message and signed hash. Receiver decrypts
the signed hash using the sender public key. Receiver also
generates another hash from the received message and com-
pare it with the received signed hash. If both are equal,
message is accepted otherwise rejected. In the propose frame-
work, HEGs use their private keys to sign and encrypt the
hash and public keys of the receiver to encrypt the message
(i.e. C1 and C2). If attacker tries to authenticate itself to the
HEG, HEG is not the able to decrypt the messages because
HEG is not able to get the public key of attacker from the
KMC which registers all HEGs public keys with itself. This
fails the authentication between HEG and an attacker and
protects the system from outsiders.
4) REPLAY ATTACKS
These are implemented by resending at a later time somemes-
sages recorded from a previous legitimate message exchange,
in order to gain access to protected resources or to privileges.
Proposed framework prevents this type of attacks by using
timestamping each message and then checking for its fresh-
ness. If a message is received within the time frame specified
in packet, it is accepted otherwise rejected as this could be a
replayed or delayed message.
Proposed elliptic curve based secure HTTP communica-
tion uses encryption to achieve protection against reconnais-
sance. Authentication attacks can also be prevented as the
adversary cannot get access to security credentials. Without
knowledge of keying material and security policies, eaves-
dropping on network traffic cannot be possible. Absolute
protection against DoS attack is impossible for any security
mechanism, however, proposed approach can significantly
reduce its impact by using MAC verification step first. The
cookie helps recipient easily detect DoS and discards packet
without processing (saves memory and CPU resources). The
effectiveness of proposed system is summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Security analysis of HTTP-based communication
between utility and the HEG.
VII. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The testbed for experimental evaluation consists of a utility
communicating with different consumer sites as depicted
in Fig. 6. The HEG software is executed on a low power
pocket PC i.e., Raspberry Pi v2 (ARMv6 700MHz, 512MB).
This prevents any incremental energy waste as Raspberry Pi
has full load power consumption of just 3.8W. A standard PC
is considered as a typical home appliance due to unavailabil-
ity of networking features on legacy household appliances.
However, it is expected that heaters, TV, lightening, refrig-
erators, air conditioners and other household appliance will
sooner or later become part of the network.
FIGURE 6. Experimental Testbed.
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The first step in experimental evaluation is the functional
verification of all three software entities in Fig. 5. The UPnP
communication architecture was efficient and devices seam-
lessly discovered each other as soon as connected to the
network. All UPnP actions reported in Table 1 and Table 2
were successfully verified. The PSM kernel module was also
reliably tracking changes in the appliance operational status.
The HEG was able to alter remotely the operational state
of household appliances whenever necessary (i.e., triggering
built-in OS calls). The WOL feature that enables the HEG to
remotely wake-up an appliance was also correctly verified.
The next step in evaluation is the analysis of different
performance factors whichmay can impair the real-time oper-
ations. The following subsections analyzes critical factors
such as latencies, resource requirements, overhead, etc.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Communication overhead is a critical factor that can affect
throughput and real-time operations for any communication
framework. It is also a factor determining the required link
bandwidth. High overhead leads to slower throughput on low
bandwidth links. For overhead analysis, we considered each
individual UPnP event such as discovery, invoking actions,
notification of state changes and de-registration. The total
experiment duration was 12 minutes during which a sequence
of activities take place (i.e., appliance registers with the HEG,
HEG remotely alters power state of the appliance, HEG
remotely wakes up the appliance, HEG de-registers with the
appliance). The overhead in terms of total number of packets
exchanged is shown in Fig. 7(a). The majority of pack-
ets were exchanged during steady state which are periodic
presence advertisements with smallest average packet size.
The average packet size during discovery and de-registration
is big due to carrying complete UPnP device and service
descriptions. The average packet size during power state
notification is very small. Further, notification messages are
very infrequent. For more clarity, Fig. 7(b) depicts the total
number of Bytes exchanged during different events which
is linked directly with the average packet size and packets
transmission rate.
Fig. 7(c) provides more detailed overhead information by
classifying packet content into real information, overhead
Bytes due to UPnP formatting, overhead Bytes due to headers
and total communication semantics overhead. It is obvious
that real information in packets is high during registration and
de-registration phases due to downloading of UPnP device
and service descriptions. The percentage of real informa-
tion is very low during action registration and state variable
update. Thus, it can be concluded that small size packet are
frequent and large size packets are rarely exchanged based on
event types. Even though, the percentage of overhead Bytes
in each packet is high, it does not affect reliability due to small
size packets.
B. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
The resource requirements were analyzed in terms of CPU,
memory and bandwidth. The CPU usage was always less
FIGURE 7. UPnP overhead analysis in proposed framework.
(a) Number of packets exchanged and average packet size
during different UPnP events. (b) Total Bytes exchanged during
different UPnP events. (c) Percentage overhead during
different UPnP events.
than 10% even on low power PC, the Raspberry Pi. This
is due to the fact that no much CPU intensive tasks are
involved in the proposed system. The memory requirement
can be more critical for HEG as the legacy gateway devices
are equipped with 16 MB or 32 MB. However, the observed
memory requirement was very low (as reported in Table 4)
which makes HEG easily portable to any legacy gateway
device. Comparing to utility and home appliances, the HEG
memory requirement is slightly higher due to the implemen-
tation of both, ECC based security mechanism and UPnP
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communication framework. The memory requirement for
utility software is very low due to implementation of basic set
of features. However, implementation ofmore complex utility
software could slightly increase the memory requirements.
TABLE 4. Memory requirement of developed software entities.
FIGURE 8. The HEG memory requirement vs number of
registered appliances.
Note that Table 4 presents memory requirement for the
HEG with a single registered home appliance. The resource
requirement for the HEG will increase with the increase in
the number of registered appliances. In a realistic scenario,
the HEG will be simultaneously managing several home
appliances. Fig. 8 analyzes the memory requirement for the
HEG with increase in the number of registered home appli-
ances. It can be observed that the memory requirement is
lower than 8 MB even with 160 registered appliances (much
higher number than in a realistic home scenario). Table 5
presents memory requirement for the HEG software for
each additional home appliance. Each appliance on average
requires 17.86 KB of additional memory at the HEG. Due
to very low memory requirement, the HEG software on a
legacy gateway device can easily manage hundreds of home
appliances.
TABLE 5. Additional required memory per device/appliance for
the HEG. The results are averaged over 100 trials.
For the HEG to manage large number of appliances,
the volume of network traffic will also increase. This leads
to additional computation and increases the CPU requirement
for the HEG. It is a critical factor that could potentially limit
the HEG scalability for managing large number of appliances
(depending on the specific hardware platform). To analyze
the robustness and scalability of the HEG, a high volume of
FIGURE 9. The HEG CPU usage under varying network
traffic load.
network traffic has been generated at the HEG. Fig. 9 depicts
the CPU usage under varying network traffic load. It can be
observed that even on a low power PC (i.e., Raspberry Pi),
the CPU usage is always less than 30% even at high volume
of network traffic. The concludes that the HEG is scalable and
suitable to be deployed on legacy gateway devices.
TABLE 6. Bandwidth requirement for developed communication
framework.
FIGURE 10. Bandwidth requirement vs number of registered
appliances.
The bandwidth requirement is very critical for any network
protocol. Low available link bandwidth than requirement
can cause traffic congestion and packet loss. The band-
width requirement for developed communication framework
is reported in Table 6 for a single registered device/appliance.
Bandwidth requirement also depends on the number of reg-
istered appliances and ideally will scale linearly. Fig. 10
depicts the minimum required bandwidth versus increasing
number of registered appliances. Due to higher overhead,
bandwidth requirement for UPnP communication framework
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is slightly higher compared to HTTP protocol. However,
the requirement is significantly lower than the supported
data rate by most of the access technologies (e.g., ADSL
Lite: 1.5 Mbps, wireless 802.11b: 11 Mbps, etc). Even for
100 registered appliances, bandwidth requirement is less than
150 kbps. Due to very low resource requirements, smooth and
reliable operations can be easily achieved on today’s access
technologies.
C. COMMUNICATION LATENCIES
Latencies can leave adverse impact on the operations of
real-time applications. In experiments, latencies were classi-
fied into two types: communication latencies and processing
latencies. Low communication latencies are very important
for reliable operations and depends on the available band-
width. It is necessary that power state notifications should be
transferred with shortest possible delay due to gap of only
1-2 seconds between kernel notification and actual change
in device power state. Further, updates on security poli-
cies should be received by the HEG with lowest possible
delay before the expiry of old credentials. Table 7 reports
observed communication latencies for developed communi-
cation framework. It can be observed that UPnP communi-
cation latency is very low and does not leave any adverse
impact on the operations. However, the reported HTTP com-
munication latency is slightly high due to use of external third
party DNS service (i.e., NO-IP DNS) in experiments. The
latency can be significantly reduced by designing a private
DNS service.
TABLE 7. Communication latencies analysis.
Processing latencies of developed software entities depend
significantly on the ECC-based encryption and signature
algorithm. Fig. 11 depicts the elliptic curve based encryption
latencies with increasing message size. The latencies are
FIGURE 11. ECC based encryption latencies with increasing
message size.
FIGURE 12. Signature latencies averaged over 100 trials.
FIGURE 13. Observed latencies vs number of registered
appliances. The lower band of values come from HEG
processing, whereas the higher band also include UPnP
communication latency.
significantly low even for large messages. Similarly, mea-
sured latencies for signature calculation are also very low as
depicted in Fig. 12. Thus, processing latencies of software
entities are always less than 20 ms and does not leave any
negative impact on the operations.
The computational requirement for the HEG will increase
with the increase in the number of registered appliances
which might affect the processing latencies. To analyze a
realistic scenario, communication and processing latencies
for the HEG have been observed in Fig. 13 for increasing
number of registered appliances. For clarity, latencies have
been measured for different stages of UPnP communication
semantics. It can be observed in Fig. 13 that increase in
the number of household appliances has negligible impact
on the observed latencies. Even for 160 appliances (much
higher number than a realistic home scenario), UPnP laten-
cies are less than 100 ms on a low power Raspberry Pi.
Fig. 14 depicts the average processing latency of the HEG
for commands received from the utility. Note, Fig. 14 does
not consider the HTTP communication latency as it depends
on the access technology used by the customers. It can be
observed in Fig. 14 that the HEG processing latency is less
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FIGURE 14. Average HEG processing latency for commands
received from the utility with increasing number of registered
appliances.
than 20 ms for commands received from the utility even with
160 registered household appliances. Due to low processing
requirement, HEG is scalable and can easily offer service
for hundreds of household appliances even on low power
gateway devices.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic energy management has several benefits for con-
sumers as well as power grids. Cutting off un-necessary loads
or scheduling them from peak demand hours to off-peak
hours not only eases pressure on power grids but also offers
economic benefits to consumers.
This paper proposed a comprehensive communication
framework based on the UPnP technology that provides
auto-discovery, zero-configuration based plug & play net-
working, interoperability, integration, privacy and security
features. In particular, basic requirements and key chal-
lenges have been identified for the utility, HEG and house-
hold appliances in the design of distributed dynamic energy
management service in smart grid. This paper proposed
a communication framework that uses UPnP technology
for local communication between the HEG and household
appliances whereas, ECC based secure HTTP protocol for
communication between the HEG and utility. The use of
UPnP technology provides numerous benefits including has-
sle free seamless networking with zero-configuration, auto-
discovery, interoperability and integration between the HEG
and heterogeneous household appliances. Experiments in real
networking environment verified the functionalities, suitabil-
ity and effectiveness of the developed UPnP communication
architecture for dynamic energy management in smart grid.
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